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Abstract. While web-based communications (e.g., webmail or web cha-
trooms) are increasingly protected by transport-layer cryptographic mech-
anisms, such as the SSL/TLS protocol, there are many situations where
even the web server (or its operator) cannot be trusted. The end-to-end
(E2E) encryption of data becomes increasingly important in these trust
models to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data against
snooping and modification.
We introduce W3Bcrypt, an extension to the Mozilla Firefox platform
that enables application-level cryptographic protection for web content.
In effect, we view cryptographic operations as a type of style to be applied
to web content, similar to and along with layout and coloring operations.
Among the main benefits of using encryption as a stylesheet are (a)
reduced workload on the web server, (b) targeted content publication, and
(c) greatly increased privacy. This paper discusses our implementation for
Firefox, although the core ideas are applicable to most current browsers.
Keywords: E2E cryptography, web security, cryptographic applications
1 Introduction
The growth in popularity of hosted web services (including online merchants,
blogging, and webmail) offers new possibilities for commerce and communication.
Unfortunately, most of these services are hosted by third parties that should not
be trusted with the content of the messages that are passed between content
publisher and the reader. As a simple example, users of popular webmail services
like MSN Hotmail or Google’s Gmail must trust that MSN or Google will respect
the confidentiality of their mail messages. Of course, the user could employ PGP
or S/MIME for email messages, but this presupposes that the webmail service
can be accessed by a trusted mail client. The webmail interfaces of these services
do not provide such a trustworthy client. Even if these interfaces supported
client-side PGP operations (via ActiveX, Flash, or a Java applet), users cannot
trust these components with their private key or passphrase.
Our goal is to build a trustworthy client-side environment into web browsers
that is independent of the service provider. This environment need not be limited
to webmail services, but it should support treating any web-service provider as
a transit conduit for an opaque block of encrypted and integrity–protected data.
1.1 E2E Security For Web Content
Traditional methods for confidentiality and integrity involve the use of cryptogra-
phy in the middle of a communications pathway. Communications involving web
content can be protected at several layers in the network stack. Connections
between client and server could be secured at the network level using IPsec.
General-purpose web servers typically employ transport layer encryption.
To the casual observer, these techniques may seem identical. Each can pro-
tect the confidentiality and integrity of the content in transit. In reality, these
approaches are orthogonal to each other and have fundamental differences. They
operate at different levels in the network and protect different notions of “con-
tent.” Most importantly, neither can protect from a compromised or malicious
application server because their confidentiality and integrity1 protections do not
reach up through the application layer.
The privacy and security of web content has usually been addressed by
TLS/SSL. Encryption at this layer presumes that the application provider is
trustworthy, just as encryption at the network level (e.g., IPsec) assumes that
the endpoints are trustworthy. In a growing number of scenarios, it is undesir-
able, if not unreasonable, for users to trust the communications provider with
the confidentiality and integrity of their data. For example, a blogger (Bob)
may not trust his hosting provider, or a customer (Alice) may not trust a com-
mercial webmail service with her banking information. Currently, the blogger is
forced to trust the blog hosting service and has no expectation of confidentiality
between himself and his readers. Likewise, a customer purchasing items from
an online store has to divulge sensitive personal and financial information to
the merchant. Revealing such information to an online store is an unacceptable
risk, especially since such entities cannot guarantee the security of their systems
against electronic (or physical) theft leading to identity theft.
For situations where we cannot trust the service provider, we advocate the
use of end-to-end (E2E) encryption where the endpoints are the actual users (or
as close to them as possible). Not only is E2E encryption good for the privacy
and security of the end user, but it is unexpectedly beneficial for service providers
as well. A recent example is AOL’s decision to allow users of its AIM instant
messaging service to encrypt their conversations E2E. The alternative would
have been for AOL to set up SSL connections for each conversation taking place
on their network. Not only does the latter choice insert AOL’s servers as de
facto men-in-the-middle (and thus violate the users’ expectation of privacy for
an encrypted conversation), it places an unreasonable performance demand on
AOL’s servers. Assuming that AOL’s business model does not require examining
1 We specifically choose not to address availability in this paper, as it would be trivial
for the service provider to impose a DoS on the user. Such an occurrence is anathema
to the concept of being a useful provider of services.
AIM traffic, the use of E2E cryptography avoids performance issues and the
associated cost of hardware, systems, and management.
1.2 Contributions
A better system would allow both the blogger and customer to treat the ser-
vice providers as a mere communications pipe through which they can tunnel
confidential information to their target audience (in Bob’s case, his readers or
subscribers; in Alice’s, her financial institution).
We present W3Bcrypt, a system for transparent E2E encryption of web con-
tent that uses public-key cryptography (e.g., PGP). W3Bcrypt can be thought
of as another layer of HTML rendering; in effect, we treat encryption as another
style applied to content. W3Bcrypt makes three major contributions:
– An E2E privacy-enhancing browser extension: W3Bcrypt provides
confidentiality and integrity to content producers who wish to publish to a
set of readers. The system also supports the ability for customers of web
merchants to communicate with their financial institution, and a way for
users of webmail systems to employ PGP even if the interface does not
support it.
– The oﬄoad of cryptographic processing from the server to clients.
SSL has typically been used to protect web communications. However, SSL
places a burden on servers that only increases with the number of clients.
With W3Bcrypt, the burden of cryptographic operations is placed mostly on
the client – content only has to be encrypted once in the server data store.
While W3Bcrypt is not meant to replace SSL, it can complement SSL to
provide a net gain in security (defense in depth) against multiple threats.
– The concept of cryptographic processing as another phase of styling
web content: Just as content is rendered by the browser for placement, size,
and coloring, so too can the content be decoded into something the user is
authorized to view.
The remainder of this paper discusses the design and implementation of
W3Bcrypt as well as background work on SSL, web spoofing attacks, and browser
security. We also provide a security analysis of the system and present a perfor-
mance evaluation.
2 Approach
The W3Bcrypt package is an extension to Firefox that permits a publisher to
securely convey content to a consumer at the application level in an end-to-
end fashion. The core functionality is the ability to perform PGP (or similar)
cryptographic operations on blocks of web content. To support these features,
the extension includes changes affecting layout operations, small additions to
the UI and the ability to invoke PGP. Since one major goal is to refrain from
modifying the source code of the browser, the new features are packaged as an
extension for easy installation, upgrade, and removal. Adding encryption as a
style takes advantage of the power of CSS, because no new tags need to be added
to the HTML grammar. Work is being done in that vein on XML encryption [9].
This section discusses our primary use cases, presents a security analysis
of the system (including the threat model, attacks, and potential countermea-
sures), and talks about some of our limitations. Section 3 discusses the actual
implementation of the Firefox extension. We provide an analysis of the system’s
performance in Section 4.
2.1 Use Cases
We are motivated to build and analyze W3Bcrypt to enhance the amount of
privacy provided by the current web infrastructure. Privacy, in this case, refers
to the confidentiality and integrity of web content – the system is not used to
obfuscate referrer headers or similar information, although it could be leveraged
for this purpose. Below, we offer three situations we have personally encountered
as motivating examples and use cases.
1. Web peers may wish to exchange information through a public email service
such as Google’s Gmail or Microsoft’s Hotmail. Currently, these services are
at liberty to scan, data mine, and store the content of the peers’ messages.
While PGP has traditionally been used to protect email communications, the
use of a webmail client makes it difficult to use PGP because the browser
has no built-in application-level key handling, and any code (ActiveX, Java,
Javascript) from the webmail provider cannot be trusted to not divulge the
private key or user passphrase. W3Bcrypt solves this problem by providing
such a trustworthy client-side environment.
2. A customer of an online merchant may wish to use the merchant as a transit
network or information conduit by passing an opaque block of data (encom-
passing the customer’s account number and billing address) to the customer’s
financial institution via the merchant. The bank or credit card company
then authorizes payment to the merchant without the merchant knowing
the customer’s account number(s). In addition, the customer could encode
her shipping address such that the merchant does not know where items are
shipped, but the transportation agent (e.g., the USPS, UPS, or FedEx) can
decode the address and deliver goods as appropriate. We discuss a possible
attack on this protection scheme in Section 2.3.
3. A web content publisher may wish to forgo or supplement traditional au-
thentication and authorization services by publishing content under a specific
“audience” key (or series of such keys). Publishers can include bloggers and
other content producers like news organizations or media companies.
2.2 Security Analysis
We present a security analysis for our major use cases, including the threat model
for each, attacks on the system, and countermeasures that the system provides
or could provide with additional implementation or support from the browser.
Threat Model In all of our proposed use cases, our threat model is based on the
concept of an untrustworthy service provider as the attacker. In the publisher use
case, the attacker is the blog-hosting provider or media-content-hosting network.
In the customer use case, the attacker is the online merchant. In the peer use
case, the attacker is the webmail provider. The service provider could be merely
curious, compromised, or actively malicious. We are not primarily interested in
defending against passive or active attackers who attempt to sniff or otherwise
control the communications links between the service provider and the client.
These traditional attacks can be addressed by using SSL, but SSL cannot protect
against a service provider because the provider controls the application level and
has access to the data after it has been processed by SSL.
Except for a special case (the Hitchhiker attack), we do not consider any de-
fense against client-side attacks such as trojan horses, viruses, spyware, or other
malware on the user’s host. In all cases, the attacker is interested in violating
the confidentiality and/or integrity of the user’s content. We believe that for
most situations the availability of content is not an issue; a service provider that
denies service is not a very effective service provider, and it is trivial to cause
DoS by changing the server to interrupt connections containing PGP content.
Yet, it is a very real possibility that the service provider has defined the
ability to examine user content as a core competency or central business need.
This type of service provider will therefore be satisfied with imposing a denial of
service on users that violate an agreement stating that users are not allowed to
obfuscate, encrypt, or otherwise hide their content from the service provider. We
consider the existence of W3Bcrypt problematic for such service providers and
demonstrate an attack that they could carry out to get around the protections
afforded by W3Bcrypt (the aforementioned special case).
We also exclude attacks on the content after it has left W3Bcrypt’s purview.
For example, a news provider may wish to employ W3Bcrypt as part of a type
of DRM scheme where content is targeted to a specific consumer or group of
consumers. After the consumer’s W3Bcrypt system has decrypted the content,
the consumer is free to copy the content and pass it on. Since the content is out
of W3Bcrypt’s control at this point, we do not consider this part of our threat
model. We note that this type of attack exists for all DRM or content distribution
schemes. Furthermore, the threat model in these situations is different from ours
– we assume that the receiver is free to do whatever they want with content
directed at them.
Attacks There are two major types of attacks against W3Bcrypt: the brute force
attack and the Hitchhiker attack. We discuss the possibility of replay attacks in
section 2.3. The brute force attack is carried out by a service provider that
attempts to discover the private key being used to sign or decrypt content.
We assume that W3Bcrypt is no stronger against this attack than PGP itself.
The attacker could also attempt to gain the key through coercion or economic
incentives, an attack that is effective against any cryptographic scheme.
The Hitchhiker attack is very interesting in that the attacker does not try
to directly subvert or control the cryptosystem. Instead, the service provider
attempts to piggyback code that bypasses the cryptographic controls on the
content and accesses the content either before or after it has passed through the
cryptosystem. Additionally, the attacker can attempt to insert web content that
is meant to masquerade or blend in with the encoded or decoded web content.
This attack is a type of spoofing attack. If the attacker has not discovered the
private key, he or she cannot forge a signature for such content.
For example, a webmail provider may include, as part of their webmail client,
Javascript that captures a user’s keystrokes. If the user later uses W3Bcrypt
to encode the mail message, the webmail provider still has a log of the plain-
text by virtue of the keystroke monitoring. Such monitoring is already done to
support automatic spell-check and automatic saving functionality in some web-
mail applications. On the receiving side, the attacker could include Javascript
that attempts to read the contents of a message once it has been decrypted by
W3Bcrypt.
Countermeasures In order to overcome the Hitchhiker attack, the browser
would ideally support a policy-driven mandatory access control on a fine-grained
namespace framework for the browser objects, like SELinux does for the Linux
operating system. Lacking such controls, we can attempt to perform input oper-
ations in a transparent overlay frame, encrypt the content in this overlay frame,
and then transfer it to the target element in encrypted form. Likewise, encrypted
content can be transferred to a new overlay frame and decrypted in that context
with “external” Javascript disabled or unable to read or write to that frame.
This solution still leaves open the question of a user that unknowingly in-
cludes malicious Javascript in the content they have encrypted. The solution
to this problem is an open area of research. One potential (but unappealing)
solution is to employ some form of model or proof-carrying code [16] combined
with a policy mechanism like the Java Policy and Permissions framework.
2.3 Limitations & Discussion
W3Bcrypt currently depends on the presence of the GnuPG software package
and invokes an xterm to call the gpg tool. We plan to improve W3Bcrypt so
that it can detect and use other PGP packages. We are also investigating the
use of the appropriate command shell tool so that W3Bcrypt can be used on the
Windows version of Firefox.
We note that W3Bcrypt alone does not support the customer use case. Mer-
chants and financial institutions would need to modify their systems to expect
PGP encoded data and process it properly. In particular, the online merchant
would need to alter input validation routines for the protected data.
Key Management As with all systems that employ a form of public key
cryptography, the issue of key management is important. We refrain from dealing
with key management or revocation. W3Bcrypt’s design avoids the use of a
large scale PKI and employs the peer-to-peer “web of trust” approach implicit
with user-managed PGP keys. Key creation, sharing, signing, and revocation are
explicitly not handled by the current tool. Instead, these operations are deferred
to the underlying PGP package. We plan to include GUI entry points (e.g., a
“buddy” list) to this functionality in later releases.
Privacy Preferences While our goal is to enhance privacy, W3Bcrypt
does not take advantage of or interface with the Platform for Privacy Prefer-
ences (P3P) initiative [6], nor is it meant to directly support other browser-
based privacy-enhancing mechanisms like referrer header rewriting or blanking,
although it could be used to do so. Determining if the use of W3Bcrypt can
benefit these areas is an open problem.
Integration Complexity In the customer use case, the customer needs to
communicate with at least three entities: the merchant, to select goods and create
the order; her financial institution, to arrange payment of the final sum; and a
shipping agent, to arrange a particular type of shipping. The merchant, in order
to make online shopping attractive to the customer, must integrate the latter
two communications into its online shopping process. Since merchants currently
expect to at least parse the customer information for sanity, a customer using
W3Bcrypt would require the merchant to partially rewrite their web application
and modify their database.
While the system provides the basis for a number of use cases, Schneier re-
minds us that security is a process, not a product. In many use cases, W3Bcrypt
handily fills an immediate need. In other situations, such as those involving com-
plex, multi-party protocols, W3Bcrypt alone does not provide adequate privacy
against higher-level attacks. As a simple example, the merchant use case assumes
that the customer wants to hide both her financial credentials and shipping ad-
dress from the merchant. However, the shipping agent usually prices service
according to location and delivery method. If the shipping agent returns this in-
formation in a plaintext format to the merchant, the merchant could potentially
guess the location of the customer (especially if the information is correlated
with information gleaned from IP address geo-location services).
In theory, these problems are not difficult to solve. The customer should
merely set up a key pair with the chosen shipping agent, financial institution,
etc. In practice, this key management may prove difficult, and leaves open the
large question of how this sort of information integration actually occurs in the
merchant’s web application.
Furthermore, any of the use cases could suffer from replay attacks, although
such an attack would be more noticeable and presumably not as harmful in the
peer and publisher use cases. Duplicate blog postings or emails will probably
be recognized as such and ignored (even if their content were relatively dire –
for example, an inflammatory news bulletin or letter of dismissal). More care
must be taken in the customer use case. The customer should include some
randomness in the data to be communicated to their financial institution. A
timestamp, sequence number, or randomly generated ticket prepended to the
account number would serve to identify duplicate transactions submitted by the
merchant. W3Bcrypt does not currently support transparently concatenating a
timestamp to all encrypted fields, but this capability is straightforward to add.
Even with these limitations, we believe our system is immediately useful,
and we employ it almost daily. We look forward to incorporating some of the
countermeasures and solutions to the limitations in our ongoing development of
the Firefox extension, which we describe next.
3 Implementation
We have implemented W3Bcrypt as an extension to version 1.5.x of the Mozilla
Firefox web browser, although the core ideas are browser-agnostic. W3Bcrypt
could easily be implemented in other popular browsers like Opera, Safari, and
Microsoft Internet Explorer, or even a text-based browser like wget or lynx.
Our extension is available at our website2. The major features of the W3Bcrypt
system include the ability to transform chunks of HTML content from and to
PGP-encrypted, ASCII-armored blocks of data. In addition, the system supports
the ability for the browser to automatically decrypt div’s marked with a special
CSS class id. The most immediately useful feature is the ability to select free
text in form objects like textareas and textboxes, access the context menu, and
utilize one of the basic PGP functions from a menu of six: encrypt, sign, encrypt
and sign, decrypt, verify, and decrypt and verify.
3.1 Package Layout
Our prototype adheres to the packaging conventions for Firefox 1.5.x extensions.
The system is comprised of four files: install.rdf, chrome.manifest, overlay.js, and
overlay.xul. The first two files are used during installation of the extension and
contain the metadata that describe the package and its capabilities. In particular,
the chrome.manifest file contains directives that overlay our new widgets on the
standard browser GUI components.
The latter two files contain the bulk of our implementation, and they are
located in the chrome/content/ subdirectory of the extension XPI file. They
reflect a clean split between the new GUI components and the raw functionality
for invoking GPG. The XUL file defines a new sub-menu for the context menu
The JS file contains Javascript functions that invoke the GPG functionality via
an xterm, and it supplies a function to automatically decrypt marked div’s.
2 http://nsl.cs.columbia.edu/projects/w3bcypt/
3.2 Integration with GPG
One of the design goals of W3Bcrypt was to provide a quick manual method
for invoking the extension functionality. To simplify implementation, we made a
design decision to leverage any PGP software already installed on the host. We
currently use GPG, which is available for both Windows and Linux (and a num-
ber of other platforms). We decided to implement the six major cryptographic
operations as choices in the context menu. These choices are gathered into a
submenu to avoid crowding the regular context menu. The various functions in
overlay.js are accessible via this context menu. These functions do some setup
work (gathering content, setting up temporary files, creating an xterm) and then
delegate to gpg. The result is gathered and written into the HTML element it
originated from, via the innerHTML attribute.
Fig. 1. Encrypted Data. After the text is selected and W3Bcrypt is invoked via the
context menu, the selected text is replaced with ASCII-armored data. This data can
be decrypted by the receiver either manually or automatically.
3.3 Auto-rendering of encrypted DIVs
One of our primary goals is to treat cryptographic content as another type of
style. To this end, the prototype recognizes specially marked div elements (those





When Firefox finishes loading the DOM for a page, the extension requests a list of
all div elements marked with the w3bcrypt class and proceeds to decrypt them,
prompting the user for his passphrase. Only the decrypt and verify operations
are automated for marked div’s, as this arrangement alleviates the burden of
manually selecting some text and decrypting it via the context menu.
4 System Evaluation
In order to make sure that the cost of employing W3Bcrypt is justifiable, we
need to quantify the impact of the system on the resources (i.e., space and
time) used by both the client and server. We employed two metrics to evaluate
the performance of the system. For the client, we focus on the overhead due to
encryption and decryption operations. On the server, we are most concerned with
the difference in storage requirements for the encrypted and plain content. We
classify objects as text or binary to differentiate between two cases: the content
stored in a database, which is mostly text, and the content served by a web
server (likely a mixture of both text and binary objects). We ignore the initial
cost of the encryption of the server’s web or database content since it happens
only once and it is not repeated for any of the subsequent client requests.
For these experiments, we used a machine with a 2.7 GHz Intel Pentium 4
processor with 1GB of RAM running a Debian Linux distribution. Cryptographic
operations were provided by GPG version 1.4.2 with the ASCII armored output
option enabled. All of the results presented are the computed averages of multiple
experimental runs with tight confidence intervals.
We used two different types of datasets in our experiment: a text repository
containing the American Constitution3 and three commercial web sites4. For the
web sites, we stored and used all the data returned when accessing their first
page, including the index page and any other pop-up, overlay, or roll-over objects
that appeared as a result of scripting. This type of capture results in slightly
larger web content sizes than what we usually expect.
4.1 Encrypted versus Plaintext Content Size
The pure text experiments use parts of the plaintext version of the American
Constitution. Figure 3 shows that for small text sizes there is a significant in-
crease in the space required for the generated ciphertext. For text sizes above
a threshold (about 2KB), we observe the opposite effect: a significant drop in
the space requirements. This is because GPG uses GNU ZLIB compression li-
brary to compress, aiming to effectively increase the entropy of the files, before
3 http://www.house.gov/Constitution/Constitution.html
4 http://www.cnn.com, www.nytimes.com and www.chase.com.
Fig. 2. Comparison of Size for Encrypted vs Plaintext. Small plaintext size have a
significant increase in the generated encrypted text size. This size drops sharply to
values below 1 for plaintext sizes of more than 2KB.
encrypting them. For smaller text sizes, this compression does not work very
well, and we can observe the opposite effect – the produced ciphertext file in-
creases in size. Of course, GPG supports other, more sophisticated, compression
algorithms which can possibly improve the encrypted file sizes for all file types.
We conducted experiments involving real web content. Figure 4 depicts our
results. In general, binary objects like images (high entropy) demonstrate size
inflation whereas pure textual objects (e.g., HTML and Javascript) undergo a
size decrease. However, the images are usually of bigger cumulative size and the
overall result is a rise in storage requirements for the encrypted files. This rise
is proportional to the initial content size, and it is almost always no more than
twice the size of the original unencrypted web content.
4.2 Overhead of Encryption & Decryption Operations
W3Bcrypt employs two types of actions: manual operations requiring user in-
tervention (encryption), and the decryption operation, which happens automat-
ically when the browser detects an encrypted object. We measure the latency
overhead from the automatic execution of an encryption or decryption of an ob-
ject or set of objects. This penalty is what really matters to the end user. When
downloading an encrypted page, the user wants to see how much longer it will
take for the page to complete. This type of measurement avoids any comparison
Fig. 3. Web Content Size Comparison. There is an increase in size for the produced
encrypted text which is proportional to the initial size of the site. This increase comes
solely from the encryption of the binary images (lower portion of the bars). HTML and
Javascript files decrease in size (upper portion of the bars).
between a manual and an automated operation and thus avoids the need to take
user-browser interaction into account.
Figure 4 displays the results of both operations on different web sites. De-
cryption takes less time than encryption both for HTML and for images. For
sites that offer content of smaller size, such as the chase.com website, the de-
cryption process requires just over half second to complete. We note that the
latency overhead depends both on the size of the site and the number of objects
that it contains. This dependency is an artifact of our implementation. We use a
different call to GPG for cryptographic operations on each object. This organiza-
tion generates extra overhead for the system since a page might contain multiple
objects. The impact is clear if we compare the encryption and decryption time
for the first two sites, in Figure 5. Although both sites have similar content
size, the first (cnn.com) has many more objects than the second (nyt.com) (see
Table 4.2) resulting in almost double the amount of time required.
Table 1. Web sites: size and number of objects




Fig. 4. Encryption and Decryption Overhead. The bars display the cumulative time for
different operations and for different site content. The lower portion of the bar indicates
the time required for the binary and the upper portion for the textual content. The
latency overhead depends on the size of the site and the number of object that it
contains.
On the other hand, all pure text operations are almost instantaneous, only
taking a few milliseconds even for large chunks of text, as shown in Figure 5.
Our tool excels when it is used for textual objects. Performance drops when the
tool is used on binary objects, but the observed times can be improved by an
implementation that first loads the page and then operates on all the encrypted
objects with just one call to the necessary library function.
5 Related Work
Our work on E2E confidentiality and integrity protection for web content draws
naturally on a number of related efforts in cryptography and web engineering. In
particular, work on XML encryption faces many of the same technical challenges.
Recent work on encrypting RSS feeds provides extra motivation, while the per-
formance and security analysis of SSL provides some insight into how W3Bcrypt
can enhance security while decreasing (or at least not significantly adding to) the
performance burden for servers. Finally, work on trusted paths for browsers and
more secure browser architectures is of interest because W3Bcrypt can provide
some level of visual disambiguation. Since non-decodable PGP blocks are ren-
dered poorly (or not at all) by the extension, they provide visual cues that the
content was not meant for the viewer (or represents untrustable content most
probably injected by a phisher). The work on more secure browser architectures
Fig. 5. Latency overhead for text. For text objects the latency overhead is just few
milliseconds. Such a delay is unnoticeable to the end user.
is of use for cases where the service provider attempts the Hitchhiker attack by
including Javascript code that tries to discover the encrypted content. During
our research, we were alerted to a parallel suggestion by Gregorio [7] to use
GreaseMonkey for encrypting RSS feeds. We take this as an encouraging sign
that the problem we are working on is a current and meaningful one.
XML Encryption Some work has been done on content encryption using
XSLT and XML. Work suggesting the element-level encryption of XML content
appeared as early as April of 2000 [13]. This work, and efforts related to it [9,
10], are complementary to W3Bcrypt. W3Bcrypt currently treats the contents
of a div element as a single-level block of content. The results are undefined
if the content includes HTML markup, although our tests show that Firefox
does successfully render the HTML markup in the auto-decrypted content. In
addition, the goals of the XML encryption projects are quite similar to some of
our use cases, especially the customer scenario.
SSL Encryption SSL is widely used to secure transport layer communica-
tion, by providing confidentiality and integrity for sessions between a web server
and a web client. However, SSL is not immune to attacks [5, 2], and since it op-
erates at the transport layer its use assumes at least a trusted server application.
We do not argue for replacing SSL; rather, we advocate for augmenting security
at another layer.
The use of SSL imposes a hefty performance penalty on servers, and much
work has been done to decrease this performance hit. Coarfa et al. [4] provide an
analysis of the bottlenecks for SSL processing and propose some adjustments to
alleviate them. Various other mechanisms for speeding up SSL by both distribut-
ing the work [12, 14] and speeding up the underlying cryptographic operations
[8] have been proposed.
Other Work Phishing is an attack that has grown in popularity. Both the
Spoofguard [3] system and Ye and Smith [17] discuss various methods of creating
a trusted path from the server to the user. Both of these systems extend the
browser to accomplish client-side protection. While W3Bcrypt is not explicitly
built to counter phishing or spoofing attacks, it could be leveraged to display
trusted content by decrypting the entire page. Injected content would not decrypt
properly (assuming that the attacker does not know the encryption key).
Ross et al. [15] implement a browser extension to generate passwords on a
per-website basis. This work is complimentary in that it explores ways to protect
multiple secrets against malicious websites. It also transparently addresses the
tendency to use the same password across multiple sites.
One of the more interesting attacks against W3Bcrypt is the Hitchhiker at-
tack. This attack is a type of cross-site scripting attack, enabled by the ability
of the attacker to piggyback Javascript code onto the page. If the browser does
not provide namespace separation and access controls (as suggested by Anupam
and Mayer [1]), then this Javascript can read content that is meant to be pro-
tected by our system. There has been some work on providing a secure browsing
environment [11] using sub-process sandboxing and privilege separation. Finally,
trusted path techniques (such as randomizing elements of the extension’s dialog
components) can help in the case of Hitchhiker code that attempts to steal the
user’s passphrase by displaying a fake dialog. In addition, we can store the user’s
passphrase so they only have to enter it once per session (identical approaches
are taken by ssh-agent and desktop mail clients).
6 Conclusions
The growth of hosted web services introduces new methods of communication,
collaboration, and commerce. In many of these situations, the client cannot
trust the service provider with the confidentiality and integrity of the client’s
data. W3Bcrypt is a practical and effective mechanism that supports the E2E
confidentiality and integrity of web content. Our implementation is an extension
to the Firefox web platform and supplies a trustworthy client-side environment
for performing cryptographic operations on web content.
Measurements show that HTML content size does not increase significantly;
rather, there is a reduction in size for text greater than 2KB. Cryptographic op-
erations take only a few milliseconds to complete, and web content that contains
both text and binary objects incurs a processing overhead that is less than 1
second for small sites and only a few seconds for larger sites.
We are motivated to work on this problem because we want to use webmail
services without forfeiting the privacy of our messages, communicate with our
financial institutions without having an intermediary learn our account informa-
tion, and publish blogs with only a selected audience knowing what the content
is. The protection offered by E2E cryptography at the application level is the
correct model for these situations. W3Bcrypt is a step in the right direction for
the privacy of end users.
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